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CHALLENGES CONFRONTING METROPOLITAN PORTLAND'S 
TRANSPORTATION DECISION-MAKING REGIME 
A regional transport decision-making regime - a set of institutional structures and 
behavioral norms governing relations between political actors - evolved in the latter 1970s 
in the Portland metropolitan area This evolution took place during the process of 
restructuring the region's approach to the utilization of transport a.s a mechanism for 
shaping metropolitan development. The most important product of this decision-making 
regime has been and continues to be a regional consensus regarding project priorities and 
general regional goals. 
In this paper we discuss the structure and dynamics of this consensus process 
through an exploration of a series of challenges to the regime. These challenges include: 
(1) cultivating new sources of project finance, as the federal government reduces its 
contribution; and (2) integrating transport projects with regional and local land use plans 
designed to manage urban growth; in the context of (3) intensifying competition between 
-business centers within the region, as rapidly growing suburban areas seek transport 
projects that will facilitate locally-oriented economic growth. We first discuss the 
institutional and normative elements of the regional consensus process in historical context. 
We then develop a set of case studies that illuminate the challenges confronting the regime 
and the nature of regime responses. 
The Nature of the Consensus 
In the mid- l 970s the Portland metropolitan region struggled to establish an 
alternative approach to continued dependence on the automobile as the piincipal mode of 
transport. Recognizing that the central bushiness district was dying and that cost of more 
freeways to serve it would be prohibitive the region sought to define and establish a role for 
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transit as an alternative transport mode. The struggle crystallized around a financing 
mechanism that would provide not only funds for transit projects but enhancements to the 
existing highway structure as a means for simultaneously serving CBD and suburban 
transport needs. The effort focused on an interstate withdrawal/transfer process producing 
a consensus that a light rail transit (LR1) line linking the City of Portland central business 
district (CBD) and the commercial center of Gresham, a suburban city in eastern 
Multnomah County (which also includes Portland), should be the region's top priority 
project In addition to this LRT line, activists assembled a package of about 140 other 
highway and transit projects to be financed with withdrawal funds. 
Transportation activists demonstrated the crucial importance of a regional 
consensus when seeking to persuade higher level governmental decision-makers to accept 
this package. Since state and national officials are very reluctant to make choices regarding 
local projects when the locals are themselves in conflict regarding priorities, presenting a 
united front plays a key role in facilitating financial participation by higher levels of 
government. The regional consensus enabled Portland-area representatives in the state 
legislature to secure necessary state matching commitments, and Oregon representatives in 
Congress to secure funding commitments at the federal level. 
The Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation (JP ACT) and the 
Transportation Policy Advisory Committee (TPAC) are the two most important continuing 
institutional expressions of the withdrawal period. The dominant cultmal feature of these 
committees is the value they attach to sustaining the consensus building process that 
emerged during the latter 1970s. This work of sustenance has been greatly facilitated by 
the relative stability of regime personnel, and their commitment to professionalism. The 
creation of the committees provided the structural means for institutionalizing the regime's 
values and processes. 
3 
Beginnings 
One of the requirements for federal funding of highway projects is the presence of 
a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) which meets federal requirements. (Weiner, 
1988). In Portland, prior to 1978, this function was fulfilled by a regional body, the 
Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG). The jurisdiction of CRAG 
included Multnomah, Washington and Clackamas Counties in Oregon and Clark County, 
Washington (which includes Vancouver, Washington). Membership of the CRAG Board 
included the City of Portland, members from each county commission and representatives 
from the larger suburban cities. Voting was weighted by the size of the jurisdiction and 
tended to be dominated by Portland and Multnomah County which held almost a majority 
of the votes necessary to make decisions. 
This arrangement presented several distinct challenges to effective governance. 
The local decision process was substantially cooperative, depending solely on the 
agreement of members for any activity. While the larger jurisdictions clearly set the tone 
and direction for decisions, they needed the votes of at least some smaller jurisdictions to 
obtain final decision outcomes. Yet, CRAG also was hampered by the omission of key 
local institutions: the Public Transit Division, Oregon Department of Transportation, the 
metropolitan mass transportation provider, and the port authority were not direct 
participants in the process. State involvement was limited to the Highway Commission and 
its role in the interstate highway system and the regional transportation plan. With the 
exclusion of some major transportation agencies, and limitation of state involvement, 
transportation planning and decisions were driven by the interests of general purpose 
jurisdictions and the highway side of the Oregon Department of Transportation. 
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At the request of Portland's Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, Governor Tom McCall 
created a task force in May of 1973 to bring clarity to the transportation planning process in 
the Portland Metropolitan area. Support for this restructuring arose from "--dissatisfaction 
with the Portland Vancouver Metropolitan Area Transportation Study (PVMA TS), citizen 
reaction to the energy crisis (of 1973), the formation of Tri-Met, and the recognition of 
CRAG's inability to function as a regional planning agency --(which) led political leaders in 
the area to the decision that it was time to reshape and restructure the workings of the area's 
planning and policy-making activities." (Final Report of the Governor's Task Force on 
Transportation, 1975). The resulting political conflicts and tension caused local political 
leaders, most notably Portland Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, to request the Governor's 
intrusion into local decision making. Finally, the GTF recommended the strengthening of 
the CRAG technical capacity, unifying the planning process and helping to develop 
comprehensive recommendations. 
Impetus for local change came from the concerted political efforts of Neil 
Goldschmidt (Portland Mayor), Gerry Drummond (Tri-Met Board Chairman), and Glen 
Jackson (Chairman of Oregon Transportation Commission) who controlled a voting 
majority after the reorganization of CRAG. Together they pushed for a greater 
consolidation of all regional planning efforts rather than multiple processes. The resulting 
organization yielded a process which went beyond the MPO requirements that CRAG had 
previously fulfilled. Each of the entities which was part of the transportation planning 
process in CRAG brought with them part of the funding which they had received when 
they were independent entities. The incentive to such cooperation was cost savings for 
each and was further motivated by the ability to access regional Federal Aid Urban monies. 
The product was an ability to more effectively articulate a regional perspective on issues 
and integrate inter-jurisdictional trade-offs within a metropolitan wide decision system. 
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The Emergence of METRO 
While efforts were underway to build a regional transportation planning and 
decision system, an independent effort to create a regional government was coming to an 
end. The Portland Metropolitan Boundary Commission had received a grant from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1975 to develop a proposal to form a 
regional governance structure for the Portland metropolitan area. Through the efforts of a 
citizens' committee a legislative proposal emerged in 1977 that led to state authorization of a 
regional vote on the creation of a new entity to provide regional services to portions of 
Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas counties. The new entity would have an 
independently elected board with twelve electoral districts exercising the regional authority 
to provide solid waste, drainage, zoo, and planning services. Authorized by state 
legislation and a citizen vote in early 1978, METRO came into existence in January, 1979. 
Created. by merging two existing entities, CRAG and the Metropolitan Service District, it 
absorbed the authority of those agencies and was also empowered to assume responsibility 
for the metropolitan transit agency through action of its board. 
The effect of creating this new entity was to shift the transportation planning 
process, formally, out of the hands of CRAG and its local government officials 
representing their respective jurisdictions, to an elected body representing geographic 
segments of the region. The METRO commissioners represented not cities and counties 
but segments of the metropolitan area. Further, the new entity represented an additional 
centralization of technical staffing since its staff assumed responsibility for the development 
of regional transportation plans. The cooperative efforts of the staffs from multiple 
jurisdictions was replaced by a dedicated transportation planning staff, supported the staffs 
of the region's cities, transit, and highway entities. 
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As a final step before its disappearance, CRAG, as a result of Neil Goldschmidt's 
efforts, adopted a resolution attempting to set an institutional agenda for the fledgling 
METRO. The resolution sought to define the projects and priorities to be funded with the 
interstate withdrawal funds. METRO attempted to adopt this resolution as a confirmation 
of the region's transportation plan. The effort was rejected by the federal government 
because it did not view METRO as a general purpose government or as composed of 
representatives of general purpose governments, a requirement of MPO's under federal 
regulations. This was confirmed by a State Attorney General's Opinion. Needing to 
identify an MPO to satisfy the federal requirements for approval of the highway withdrawal 
funds, a request was made to then Governor Atiyeh to appoint a body to serve as the MPO. 
Atiyeh required METRO to designate some other body as the forum for regional decision 
making. This lead directly to the creation of JPACT in 1979. At the same time, the TPAC 
also was formed. 
JPACT was effectively the old CRAG Board resurrected. The same membership 
was designated for the purposes of reviewing transportation planning documents and 
policies. TPAC was the transformation of the former joint efforts of the professional 
planning staffs of the respective jurisdictions to advise and support policy documents and 
processes. TPAC provided staff assistance to JPACT on an as needed basis. JPACT 
recommended policy and planning approvals to the METRO Board which formally 
accepted them. JP ACT thus became the defacto ~O body for making recommendations 
to the federal government through METRO. 
Previously, CRAG's internal management and decision processes appeared to 
suffer from a lack of continuity and authoritativeness. Each new director faced decisions 
which were increasingly difficult to resolve. At the end of a two year term, the frustrated 
director was happy to move on, leaving the position to be filled by someone else. The 
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result was that a succession of directors failed to bring the CRAG process into focus. 
Political leadership was focused outside the process, first in Glen Jackson (Chairman of the 
Oregon Transportation Commission), then in Neil Goldschmidt. Without effective or 
continuing leadership, CRAG failed to sustain momentum behind any of its projects. Until 
Portland's mayor managed to focus and forge a political consensus through a weighted 
voting process, tensions between the central cities and suburbs and the lack of transit and 
state involvement created a tenuous decision process. 
JPACT Formation 
As indicated above, JP ACT embodied much of CRAG's transportation role. The 
agreements and alliances which were achieved to create a mixed transit and highway system 
planning process depended on the agreement of all parties to the process, every affected 
jurisdiction was involved. In having all jurisdictions involved in the same process, the 
CRAG system had been unique. The transition from CRAG to JP ACT involved some . 
important transformations. 
The development of the organizational relationship of JP ACT to METRO was 
never fully discussed in the formation of METRO. There was a split between the parties to 
the process of developing JPACT over who would be the actual decision-maker. Some 
wanted JPACT to make the decisions, others wanted METRO to be responsible. An 
unwritten agreement was developed which allows METRO to approve JPACT decisions. 
In this way, the regional intergovernmental consensus role initiated in CRAG could 
develop and continue in a way which is not possible in METRO.since it does not play the 
interstate or state-wide role in transportation policy development role which CRAG played. 
(CRAG had bi-state funding, METRO is a single state organization which incorporates 
interstate interests through the JPACT). 
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When METRO was formed, Vancouver and Clark County, Washington created the 
Intergovernmental Resource Center (IRC) which serves as the MPO for that area of 
Washington. Their input is derived through membership on JP ACT, but they are not 
represented on METRO. JPACT was formed as an embodiment of the transportation 
process of CRAG, retaining the original membership, but serving under a board with a 
more limited authority. 
JPACT deals with problems in an aonosphere that presumes a continuing 
cooperative process. There is a dignity and professional nature in the process which 
contributes to the level of commitment which each of the participants brings to the process. 
The process is not summary - a case which is presented must be developed and made in full 
- that is the expectation and the reality. It is described as a professional game where anyone 
(citizen, professional, political) who plays by the rules of the game will be included in the 
process. This professional atmosphere contributes to the confidence in the system which 
provide its vitality and validity. 
Structure of JPACT 
JPACT currently consists of 17 members, a structure which has been unchanged 
since the committee was originally formed in early 1979. The institutional members are as 
follows: 
3 members of the METRO Council 
1 Commissioner for the city of Portland 
3 County Commissioners, one each from Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington 
Counties in Oregon 
3 Elected officials, one from each Oregon county, representing cities 
1 Representative of the Oregon Department of Transportation 
9 
1 Representative of Tri-Met 
1 Representative of the Port of Portland 
1 Representative of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality 
1 Elected representative from Vancouver, WA 
1 Elected representative from Clark County, WA 
1 Representative from the Washington Department of Transportation 
While this formal membership has not changed, many other individuals have affected 
JP ACT's decision processes as advisors or influential community leaders. These 
individuals have included METRO staff, representatives of local governments, private 
citizens, and business representatives who have bad an interest in the process or outcome 
of transportation decisions. 
The continuity of JP ACT's formal membership has contributed one major · 
element to the political balance within which JPACT operates---the ability to move beyond 
individual interests to focus on broader, regional questions. The political tradeoffs and 
compromises committed in the development of a set of regional priorities have benefitted 
from bargains maintained and deals remembered through the static membership. New 
issues and questions have been raised by the continuing cast of actors, not new actors, 
facilitating political consensus and stability. 
Voting in JPACT was initially recorded in detail including the votes of the 
committee members and their identity as members of METRO, local elected officials, or 
representatives of agencies which were responsible for implementation. This process is no 
longer so formalized. Most issues are decided on the basis of a voice vote which produces 
a record only of the number of votes cast on each side of an issue. While dissent is 
possible, it occurs rarely. The consultative nature of the decision process and the 
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interaction before votes are taken produces the consensus necessary to determine the 
outcomes. Hence, most votes are confirmations of the decision process. 
The formal minutes of JPACT meetings identify the issues with which it has 
dealt, reflecting the relatively public process of decision making. The identification of 
issues and their prioritization is largely a product of the structure and composition of 
JP ACT's membership and its interaction with its various sources of funding. The 
traditional jurisdictional responsibilities for the maintenance and development of various 
elements of the transportation network have tended to generate questions concerning 
resources. Regional projects and concerns have arisen out of the joint process of 
recognizing spill-over benefits and costs of solving more localized problems. Hence, 
suburban commuter access to Portland's CBD has not been seen as just Portland's problem 
but shared with suburb jurisdictions which have desired access to to other areas of the 
region. The pursuit of funding sources, mostly federal, has driven the steps which have 
had to be taken in developing plans and implementing projects. 
Another important feature of the JP ACT decision process is that JP ACT is a 
policy body. While there are representatives of a variety of jurisdictions and implementing 
agencies, the role of JPACT is largely one of selecting among alternatives which are 
presented to it. The important technical dimension of input comes from another committee, 
Transportation Policy Alternative Committee (TP AC). TP AC is the technical arm of the 
transportation planning process. The membership includes the technical staffs of all the 
jurisdictions and agencies represented on JPACT, but adds the following members: 
A representative of the Federal Highway Administration 
A representative of the Federal Aviation Administration 
A representative of the Urban Mass Transportation Association 
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A representative of the Intergovernmental Resource Center of Clark County 
Six citizen representative appointed by the METRO Council. 
While this is largely a representative body, there are two dynamics which strongly 
influence the process. The first influence is the relative size and strength of the METRO 
transportation staff. METRO's Director of Transportation Chairs TPAC and serves as 
Executive Director to JPACT. Reflecting earlier commitments to upgrade METRO's 
technical capacity, the staff is closely affiliated with the JP A CT process, is large and has 
significant resources available to it for planning and in interacting with regional, state and 
federal governments. The METRO staff serves as the operational group for accomplishing 
regional planning and development It is aided by TPAC which provides technical 
guidance and assistance. TP AC provides the technical expertise in both planning and the 
administrative requirements and implications of the transportation and development 
process. On occasion, professional staff from TP AC member agencies are loaned to < 
METRO to assist in completing projects. The symbiotic relationship between the two 
committees has fostered a unique blending of technical and political decision making. Few 
decisions are made which cannot be supported from both perspectives. 
Also of significance is the reliance on METRO generated population, 
transportation and economic forecasts. As a reflection of the arrangement leading up to the 
designation of METRO as the MPO, a formal agreement places responsibility for 
forecasting socio-economic changes in the METRO staff. While metropolitan jurisdictions 
may choose to suggest alternative growth and development scenarios, the data base for 
these projections remains fixed and maintained by METRO. This has worked effectively 
for the area south of the Columbia River. However, there is some feeling that the 
development of METRO projections is inadequately influenced by forecasts from the 
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planning agencies in Washington. This has produced a perception of bias unfavorable to 
transportation development north of the Columbia River. 
The METRO Councillors on JPACT have had some impact on the 
development of policy agendas. Generally, however, the policy lead on issues comes from 
JP ACT itself. This is in pan due to the recognition of the expertise and experience which 
characterize TPAC. Additionally, the complexity of the funding structure and the attendant 
administrative processes require that events be sequenced in panicular ways. TPAC has 
provided the expertise necessary to identify and clarify the maze off ederal regulations and 
procedures through which the JP ACT process develops its projects. 
Funding 
Funding for JP ACT is accomplished through several mechanisms but is not 
permanently dedicated. Metropolitan area jurisdictions pay population per capita dues to 
METRO. Of $600,000 collected in 1988-89, $350,00 was committed to JPACT to support 
METRO's transportation staffwork on JPACT activities. As the MPO, METRO receives 
Highway Planning and Research Funds and UMTA Planning monies ($450,000 in 1988-
89). A third source of funding is supplemental funds provided by metropolitan 
jurisdictions to upgrade METRO's planning ability. Tri-Met provides $50,000 annually. 
Portland also contributes under an inter-agency agreement as do other jurisdictions. This 
third source provides another $400,000 annually in support of JPACT. Finally, special 
projects have supplied additional revenues in support of METRO's annual workplan. 
Support is provided also through provision of staff for project technical development. The 
contributions of staff serve the additional role of enhancing interaction between local 
planning agencies thereby providing a firmer foundation for inter-jurisdictional consensus 
than would otherwise exist. While there is some nominal differentiation between special 
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project and routine staff funding, in practice there is a substantial intermixing of these 
resources. 
Planning Agency Interactions 
There are many planning agencies in the metropolitan area served by METRO. 
Each of these agencies plays its own role, but there is a high degree of interaction which 
serves to unite the institutional relationships . A significant factor in the process is the 
extent to which planning agencies provide staff to JPACT and to TPAC. Those individuals 
with planning expertise on a local level are frequently the individuals chosen by that 
jurisdiction to serve on JP ACT. JPACT members also bring with them the staff who 
provide the technical expertise from their own jurisdictions. Since there is a great level of 
crossover between planning agencies and JP ACT, there tends to be a substantial level of 
agreement on issues. 
There are several structural relationships which contribute to the high degree of 
interagency cooperation. There is a general dependence on METRO for land use planning, 
traffic forecasting and population forecasts. Additionally, there are many technical 
advisory committees which rely on planning and forecasting from METRO in developing 
their recommendations. As a consequence, issues of representation and of spatial 
competition are not frequent topics on JPACT's agenda. 
In addition to these institutional and political cultural factors, the great weight 
of the Portland CBD in the regional political economy undergirds the transport regime. 
During the withdrawal period downtown Portland was just beginning to confront suburban 
competitors for office and commercial investment. The choice of a downtown/radial LRT 
line - and the reconstruction of a downtown/radial freeway sharing the same corridor -
reflected the weight of the Portland CBD in the consensus building process. Suburban 
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business centers have, however, grown rapidly in recent years, and the now familiar 
pattern of suburban gridlock is evident in several outlying areas. Downtown Portland 
maintains, though, its dominant position in the region, even as it faces increasingly intense 
competition for investment in the activities historically concentrated there. This dominant 
role is widely, if grudgingly, acknowledged, and the recognition serves as a counter to 
pressures that would fragment the consensus. 
Political Actors 
The Oregon congressional delegation emerged as an effective articulator of the 
regional consensus in the national government during the withdrawal period, and has 
continued to play this role, much as Canadian provincial governments champion the 
interests of their major urban centers. The absence of any competing major metropolitan 
area in the state has enhanced the willingness and the capacity of the delegation to serve as 
an effective advocate, within rough limits established by the political clout of rural 
interests. Similarly, in Canada each provincial government acts to mute intra-metropolitan 
competition, and to strengthen the competitive position of its leading metropolitan area in 
relation to those in other provinces. 
The Nature of the Challenges 
The Portland regime now confronts a set of challenges which generate conflicting 
pressures on the consensus process. One is financial. Regional transport activists 
anticipate a continuing reduction in the level of federal funding for projects, necessitating an 
increase in state, local, and private sector contributions to offset the decline. On the one 
hand, reductions in the level of federal investment generates pressure to maintain the 
regional consensus in order to effectively compete with other metropolitan areas for a share 
of a shrinking federal pie. On the other hand, the prospect of lowered funding levels 
increases the intensity with which project sponsors advocate a higher priority on behalf of 
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particular projects, and, therefore, the level of conflict which the consensus process must 
contain. Moreover, the necessity of including private sector financial participation may 
exacerbate these conflicts, in that places with poor private developmental prospects will be 
less able to secure commitments to projects. 
A second challenge is the integration of transport projects with comprehensive land 
use plans. Projects and plans have uneasily coexisted since the modem field of urban 
planning began to talce shape in mid-nineteenth century Europe. Historically speaking, 
transport project sponsors have easily overwhelmed the efforts of planners to constrain 
them within an overall design for urban growth. Planners and planning processes were 
greatly strengthened, however, particularly in Oregon, by the environmental movement that 
surfaced in the 1970s. While Portland's new transport regime began to emerge shortly 
after the adoption of the State's land use planning law, the interface between environmental 
and transport planning perspectives was not an easy one. 
The new environmentally-based planning challenges the relatively narrow concerns 
of the transportation regime. In the face of this challenge, regime supporters may close 
ranks to defend against a broadening of perspective that might compromise the 
effectiveness of transport projects as facilitators of economic growth. At the same time, 
effective environmentally-based planning is widely seen as a crucial competitive advantage 
enjoyed by metropolitan Portland, as the region struggles to attract investment from Seattle 
and the California urban centers afflicted by unplanned urban sprawl. The desire to 
maintain this widely appreciated competitive advantage creates pressure to restructure the 
regime, in order to tip the balance of power between transport projects and land use plans 
more toward the latter than has historically been the case. 
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Generally speaking, the most basic challenge to any regional consensus process is 
competition between subregional places to maintain and attract investment Competition 
causes each business center to sponsor transport projects that will enhance the locational 
attractiveness of that particular center. Projects become weapons that places deploy to gain 
competitive advantage, intensely politicizing the decision-making process. Those projects 
that concentrate benefits in space, as freeways and rail transit lines do around interchanges 
and stations, generate the most controversy, as they will greatly advantage some places and 
disadvantage many others. In Portland, the regime emerging from the 1970s was able to 
contextualize projects in a manner which provided for trade-offs between centers while 
evading the political grid lock of intense spatial competition. 
We noted above that the Portland CBD faces increasingly intense competition from 
suburban business centers, though it continues to maintain its dominant position in the 
regional political economy. The consensus process now includes more assertive suburban 
activists seeking projects that will enhance the autonomy of their centers. Designing 
individual projects and assembling packages of projects that will serve the development 
aspirations of the many competing places in this hierarchical regime becomes more 
problematic. At the same time, the continued dominance of downtown Portland 
encourages CBD activists to insist on the priority of projects that will maintain the 
privileged position of their place. 
The consensus that was constructed during the withdrawal period was built using 
federal funds, so the challenge of making up for reductions in these contributions had not 
yet surfaced. Spreading 140 projects around the region effectively addressed the challenge 
of competition between places seeking to use transport projects to facilitate local economic 
growth. The LRT line and the reconstructed freeway would primarily benefit downtown 
Portland, however, the location of LRT stations would enable CBD activists to form an 
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alliance with their counterparts in Gresham at the eastern end of the line. Including the 
myriad highway and transit projects throughout the metropolitan area paved the way for 
activists from suburban Washington and Clackamas Counties to support the consensus. 
Finally, the withdrawal period coincided with the start-up phase of Oregon's statewide land 
use planning program. The many jurisdictions in the region, including the Metropolitan 
Service District (Metro), were busily mapping urban growth boundaries and preparing 
comprehensive land use plans that would accommodate a substantial amount of 
development 
Case 1: Relocating a Central Portland Freeway 
During the process of updating and revising the highly regarded 1972 downtown 
Portland plan, proposals to relocate a stretch of Interstate freeway that skirted the edge of 
the CBD along the east bank of the Willamette River surfaced. The fate of these proposals 
illustrates how the regime responded to a land use-based challenge emanating from the 
region's dominant place. 
This segment of Interstate 5 has come to be regarded by many neighborhood 
groups, civic organizations, architects, planners, and city government officials as a land 
use and design disaster, denying the public access to valuable riverfront land. The Portland 
Planning Commission appointed an Eastbank Freeway Study Options Committee to 
examine the possibilities, chaired by a state senator representing Portland who also chaired 
of the Senate Transportation Committee. The Planning Commission voted to support the 
Committee's recommendation to further study a realignment of the freeway that would 
"liberate" about 21 acres for park and related riverfront development. The regional 
consensus process had already approved a $54 million project to increase the efficiency and 
safety of the existing freeway. The Committee's recommended alternative would add $70 -
$90 million to this project's cost.. 
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Regime response to the Portland Planning Commission's proposal was swift and 
to the point. JP ACT members, particularly elected officials representing suburban 
Clackamas and Washington County jurisdictions, expressed serious reservations, worrying 
that freeway relocation would " ... j eopardize the hard-won position of other projects on the 
list." A Clackamas County Commission JPACT member pointed out that "We don't want 
our transportation projects held back in any way." The Oregonian, the major metropolitan 
newspaper and a staunch supporter of the consensus process, editorially cautioned that 
relocation money " ... ought not be cut out of the region's carefully considered regional 
transportation agenda." (The Oregonian, 1988) The state senator who had chaired the 
Study Committee tried to calm these fears, saying "I want you all to relax. We don't want 
to take it out of the hides of any one else's project." Relocation proponents noted that 
congressional action would be necessary to move the freeway. Leading members of the 
Oregon congressional delegation pointed out, however, that they would follow JP ACT's 
guidance on this issue, thereby signalling their intention to maintain regime integrity 
(Mayer, 1988). 
A great many speakers supported relocation when the Portland City Council met to 
consider the Planning Commission's recommendation, led by a group calling itself 
"Riverfront for People". Many technically and politically sophisticated people were 
involved in this organization, including some of the region's leading citizen transit activists, 
and the Director of the Portland Planning Bureau during the Mount Hood Freeway revolt. 
JPACT's chair, however, told the Council that " ... the project wouldn't ever become a top 
regional priority because it addresses land-use issues more than transportation needs." 
(Oliver, 1988) Another JPACT member warned the Council of "money conflicts brewing" 
over the move, and said that JPACT should be involved in considering the proposed 
project: "If an accommodation is not worked out, open political warfare could erupt - with 
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the result that all the region's governments could be left out in the cold." Just before the 
Council met the Multnomah County Board of Commissioners refused to support moving 
the freeway, arguing that the project should not talce precedence over existing priorities 
(Kohler, 1988). 
The Council voted to conduct a more detailed study of the relocation issue. 
Council members were distinctly reluctant to express strong opinions on the question. The 
study would be carried out by the Oregon Department of Transportation, assisted by a 
citizens committee. This group would consist of those individuals who had previously 
served on the Planning Commission's Study Committee, as well as a number of additional 
members drawn from JP ACT and the Oregon Transportation Commission. 
The Council's actions clearly reflected the conflicting internal and external 
pressures being brought to bear. Relocation advocates, including one council member 
committed to the project, drew attention to the "historic opportunity to change the face of 
the city, to ensure that Portland remains the center of the region, to attract tourists, to 
generate economic development and to create one of the most exciting parkways in the 
United States." This would be the first time in the nation's history that an interstate 
freeway would be moved "simply because it was deemed to be in the wrong place." 
(Mayer, 1989) Supporters argued that this was a project worthy of a citizenry that had 
"reclaim[ ed] their downtown from the decline and economic devastation created by the 
postwar freeway binge," (Ames, 1989) and had garnered national recognition for bold 
efforts in urban environmental design. 
Yet the Council was clearly concerned about retribution if the City was seen as 
disrupting the regional consensus. More specifically, the council member most closely 
associated with the transport regime, JP ACT member Earl Blumenauer (a Portland City 
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Councilman), worried that the freeway relocation project would threaten the regional 
commitment to a network of downtown-oriented light rail lines, one of which, Westside 
LRT, was currently "enshrined" as the top priority project in the region. The unanimous 
Council vote to include JP ACT members on their study committee was on a Blumenauer-
sponsored motion. 
The City's Freeway Options Committee ended up badly divided after three months 
of intensive study. The Committee voted 7-6 to support relocation, however, they failed to 
make any recommendations regarding funding. The state senator who had chaired the 
Planning Commission's study group likewise chaired the City Committee, and cast the tie-
breaking vote in favor of relocation. The level of controversy immediately escalated. A 
group of fourteen Portland-area state legislators signed a letter supporting the project, and 
recommended that a federal demonstration grant be pursued. They were countered within 
two weeks by a letter signed by sixteen state legislators, most of whom represented 
Washington and Clackamas County constituencies, opposing the project A JPACT 
member who was a Washington County Commissioner said that JPACT "probably would 
not even support the idea of moving the freeway unless it was decided to 'assess the 
remainder of the cost to the area of benefit - the downtown (Portland) region." The state 
senator chairing the Committee countered that "'[M]aybe Washington County should pay' 
for the $150 million Westside Bypass proposed in Washington County." (Green, 1989) 
This proposed freeway was Washington County's top priority project, and was 
"enshrined" in the regional consensus. A top Clackamas County transportation planner and 
TP AC member "charged that there was a 'massive inequity' in the decision-making process 
surrounding the east bank freeway ... " and that two major County projects would be 
directly in conflict with the relocation (Kohler, 1989). Two Portland representatives on the 
Metro Council added to the controversy by announcing their support for relocation. 
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The consensus was stabilized, however, when the Mayor of Portland announced 
that he would oppose relocation. The mayor decided to follow Council member 
Blumenauer in banking on a network of light rail transit lines as the key transport objective 
for the City. The mayor was now convinced that the freeway relocation project would 
jeopardize future rail funding: " ... an attempt to find the money [for relocation] by upsetting 
the carefully negotiated regional transportation plan could 'cause tremendous bitterness' 
among the city's neighbors." (Mayer, 1989) In response to the suggestion made by 
Riverfront for People and others that a special federal grant be sought for the project, 
Blumenauer argued that "Oregon's congressional delegation can only be asked to go to bat 
for Portland on one major issue at a time ... " (Zusman, 1989) Following the mayor's 
announcement, two other City Council members said they would join the mayor in 
opposition. Together with Blumenauer this constituted a decisive 4-1 rejection of the 
relocation project. 
Throughout the freeway relocation controversy JP ACT members and other regime 
supporters, including the Oregon congressional delegation, clearly, self-consciously, and 
consistently articulated the importance of maintaining the regional consensus. This land 
use-based challenge was brought by activists operating outside the regional consensus 
process. The regime withstood this challenge, effectively defending the integrity of the 
transport projects within its domain. A measure of the strength of the regime was the fact 
that even relocation proponents spoke the language of consensus arguing that their 
advocacy need not constitute a threat. The case illustrates how deeply wedded the local 
governments in the region are to the consensus process, including the Portland City 
Council. The Council's decision to reject the relocation project demonstrated Portland's 
sensitivity regarding its leading place in the regional hierarchy, and the City's capacity to 
refrain from attempting to exploit its dominant position. Given the self-understanding of 
the Portland leadership as pioneers and leading practitioners of the art of central city 
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revitalization, this act of self-restraint testifies to the staying power of the regional transport 
regime as institutionalized structurally and politically through its earlier successes. 
Case 2: The Westside Bypass 
The proposed Westside Bypass presents a more serious land use-based challenge 
to the regime than did the central Portland freeway relocation project for two reasons: (1) 
Many more jurisdictions are directly affected by the Bypass, including several suburban 
cities and Washington County at the western edge of the region and, (2) part of the 
proposed route would lie outside of the Metro-adopted Regional Urban Growth Boundary. 
The Bypass, which would be a north-south arc traversing the western edge of the 
metropolitan area, has raised the widely feared spectre of traffic-induced sprawl. The 
Bypass has been Washington County's top priority project for quite some time, especially 
for the western part of the County, which has experienced an electronics industry-related 
employment boom; the area is Oregon's "Silicon Forest" County activists have been 
pointing out that traffic increasingly circulates within the County, rather than between the 
County and Portland, and that the Bypass was crucially important to serve the growing 
economic autonomy of the area. 
Following the JPACT and Metro Council decisions to add the Bypass to the 
regional consensus priority list, The Oregonian lectured Washington County officials on 
their responsibilities. A lecture was seen as necessary because of the perception that 
Washington County had historically been insufficiently attentive to regional concerns, had 
displayed a "go-it-alone, independent attitude, and was prone to pursue narrow, growth-
related objectives. The Oregonian editorialized two challenges to County officials: "One is 
to show that participation in a metropolitan partnership is genuine and not just lip service 
masking insular inclinations. The other is to show enough backbone in controlling 
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development to give the rest of the region confidence that the bypass would not lay open 
land supposedly protected by the urban growth boundary." (The Oregonian, 1987) 
Washington County's director of land use and transportation planning, a TP AC member, 
had already promised to immediately work out a program to resolve land use issues with 
Metro. JP ACT approved funds for Washington County to begin preliminary engineering. 
At this point in time, the Bypass project was conceived of as a long-term project that would 
be built in stages, the first stage of which would not involve any growth management-
related concerns. The sections of the Bypass that would cross over the urban growth 
boundary were several years away. 
The land use brew thickened when the Washington state legislature expressed 
interest in a third bridge over the Columbia River. This project was especially exciting to 
Clark County officials as one that would facilitate industrial development in their area 
They hoped that another bridge would excite the Portland regional transport regime 
sufficiently to extend the Westside Bypass in a northeasterly direction all the way to the 
new river crossing, thereby providing a much more direct connection between Clark 
County and industrial development zones in western Washington County. The Bypass 
extension would, however, cross Portland's Forest Park, one of the largest urban parks in 
the United States, much of which was wilderness. Intense environmental opposition soon 
surfaced. There would soon be environmental opposition in Clark County as well, because 
of the routing of a connecting highway there. The Intergovernmental Resource Center, the 
Clark County MPO, strongly supported the idea and was studying it at the request of the 
Washington state legislature. They recommended a much more elaborate third bridge study 
that would be jointly funded by Washington and Oregon agencies. Clark County officials 
readied a presentation to JPACT to secure a regime commitment. A Washington County 
transportation planner approved the logic of extending the Bypass to fully encircle the 
metropolitan area. However, a City of Portland transportation planner and TP AC member 
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sounded a note of caution, arguing that before funds were committed to a third bridge 
study, a policy question ought to be resolved: was opening up new lands for economic 
growth the objective, or relieving traffic congestion on an existing bridge the main concern. 
This planner thought the former goal was uppermost in the minds of Clark County 
officials. TP AC's chair, who was also METRO's director of transportation planning, 
shared this perspective. The transportation regime's agenda, however, was concerned 
about the latter. 
When the Clark County members of JPACT presented their bi-state study idea to 
TPAC, the technical officials clearly indicated that a third bridge would be a low-priority 
item on the regional transport project list They recommended against regime (JP ACT) 
participation in the study. TPAC's chair recommended instead that METRO and Clark 
County's Intergovernmental Relations Center cooperate on a study of congestion on 
existing routes and the possibilities of extending light rail transit into the County. A Clark 
County official asked that a vote on this recommendation be delayed while fW1her 
discussions were pursued. JPACT later agreed to delay a decision. 
When JPACT did consider Clark County's invitation to a study, the Clark County 
officials presentation of their request markedly changed. They stressed looking at traffic 
congestion in general, and that a third bridge might be one possible answer to corridor 
congestion concerns. JPACT later decided to reject any examination of a third bridge, but 
to support a bi-state study along the lines suggested by the TP AC chair. This would 
involve an earlier and more concentrated look at possible LRT lines linking downtown 
Portland and the City of Vancouver than JP ACT had previously contemplated. The 
Washington state JP ACT delegation was pleased, having decided to give priority attention 
to LRT in the face of concerted opposition to the third bridge idea. JPACT member Earl 
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Blumenauer, a leading LRT supporter, noted that the City of Portland would likely 
participate financially in such LRT studies. 
While JPACT dealt with Clark County issues, the level of conflict on the Westside 
Bypass dramatically increased. 1000 Friends of Oregon, the state's land use law 
watchdog, legally challenged the status of the Bypass in Washington County's 
Transportation Plan on the grounds that land use issues had not been addressed before the 
County committed to the freeway in its Plan. The state Department of Land Conservation 
and Development (DLCD), which administers Oregon's land use laws, filed a separate 
appeal, arguing that the County's plan lacked an explicit agreement that the Bypass would 
be dropped if state land use requirements were not met. There had been an understanding 
on this point between the County and the State. The State had permitted the County to 
include the Bypass in order to facilitate the search for financial support through the 
consensus process. However, the official Plan failed to make the understanding explicit. 
Both 1000 Friends and DLCD were concerned about the sprawl-inducing impacts of those 
portions of the Bypass located outside the existing urban growth boundary. 
The Washington County Board of Commissioners quickly moved to include the 
explicit agreement sought by DLCD, and to do a study that would determine whether or not 
the Bypass should be excused from land use laws protecting agricultural land outside urban 
growth boundaries. In addition, the County committed to study alternatives to the Bypass 
in case the project could not be exempt from the state land use laws. DLCD then dropped 
its appeal. However, 1000 Friends refused to follow DLCD's lead, threatening to proceed 
with their appeal unless and until Washington County dropped all reference to the Bypass 
in its Transportation Plan and addressed the land use question of whether or not a freeway 
was needed in that corridor at all. This constituted a direct challenge to the transportation 
regime; the Bypass was enshrined in JPACT's and Metro's transport plan. The attorney 
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representing 1000 Friends said "We think this is going to be used to bust the urban growth 
boundary." 
The regime countered with a METRO Council decision to intervene in the case 
being heard by the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA): "METRO should be 'at the 
table,' the Council's presiding officer said, if 1000 Friends and Washington County wind 
up negotiating some sort of a settlement that could affect METRO's system for reaching 
consensus on transportation projects." ("METRO, 1989) A coalition of 36 business 
groups and local governments joined Metro as intervenors on behalf of the Bypass. 1000 
Friends drew support from citizens organized as Sensible Transportation Options for 
People (STOP), which filed a separate appeal with LUBA. This was the same name as the 
one chosen by the citizens group that had led the opposition to the construction of the 
Mount Hood Freeway. A veteran of the earlier citizen movement told the Washington 
County activists, "People can kill freeways." (Foyston, 1989) STOP stressed rail transit 
and incremental highway improvements as alternatives to the Bypass. 
LUBA decided in favor of 1000 Friends' position, ordering Washington County to 
redo its transportation plan so that it did not appear that the County was already committed 
to the project Land use analyses aimed at determining whether a freeway was needed at all 
in that corridor had to come first, according to LUBA. 1000 Friends hailed the LUBA 
decision as a "major rerouting of the mindset" regarding the project. Washington County 
and Metro representatives disagreed; they did not think LUBA had altered the transportation 
planning process they had been following at all. County Commissioners were saddened, 
however, that the decision would set back construction of the crucial first stage of the 
project for two years, while the need for the entire Freeway was restudied. The Oregonian 
saw the LUBA decision as a victory for comprehensive planning, which would consider 
land use and transportation issues together. In the wake of the Bypass ruling, a DLCD 
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official pointed out the implications of the decision for projects being planned elsewhere in 
the region, particularly in Clackamas County, where similar urban growth boundary 
concerns were likely to emerge. State land use and transportation officials began meeting 
to clarify the rules regarding when the regime would have to take state land use goals into 
account, particularly those concerning defense against urban sprawl, and when particular 
projects would be exempt. The TPAC chair pointed out that current rules were less than 
clear, and welcomed the effort at clarification. 
The problem of integrating land use plans and transport projects has been noted in 
an analysis of the state land use planning program (DeGrove, 1984). Integration is clearly 
more than a technical challenge for the regime. 1000 Friends of Oregon is an extremely 
well-organized, attentive, politically and technically sophisticated organization. They have 
prospered in their watchdog role, and stand ready and willing to oppose the regime on land 
use and environmentally-related transport matters. STOP and 1000 Friends will closely 
monitor the formulation and implementation of the rules that emerge from the process of 
clarification now underway. The question is: will the regime accommodate to plans, or will 
the logic of the project continue to drive the urban development process. 
Case 3: Light Rail Transit Planning 
After the federal government committed funds to build the eastside LRT line in 
place of the Mount Hood Freeway, the regime turned its attention to the next LRT project. 
A westside line, linking downtown Portland and the eastern Washington County city of 
Beaverton, emerged as the top priority project. From the point of view of Portland CBD 
leaders, this route would add commuter capacity in the increasingly congested Sunset 
Highway Corridor. The proposed line would not extend, however, into western 
Washington County. 
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JPACT endorsed a particular westside LRT alignment in 1983, however, the Tri-
Metropolitan Transit District (fri-Met) hesitated to apply for funds from the federal 
government to begin preliminary engineering on this project. Tri-Met had financial reasons 
to worry about applying for a matching grant. However, another cause for concern was 
opposition to the project that had surfaced in western Washington County. At the same 
time, Clackamas County transportation and economic development planners had joined 
with planners at the Port of Portland to propose an LRT line running south from Portland 
International Airport, through a connection with the eastside LRT line, to a major regional 
shopping center in the County. This line would share a corridor with the recently 
constructed eastside bypass freeway, I-205, for most of its length. 
Washington County transport activists, particularly those in the west, were shifting 
their focus away from a westside LRT line to the Bypass Freeway. Applauding this shift, 
the Argus, one of Washington County's leading newspapers based in the western County 
seat of Hillsboro, editorialized "We would far rather see ... money ... spent to facilitate north-
south traffic in Washington County- where it is urgently needed - rather than boosting 
travel from our County into downtown Portland." (Argus, March 12, 1985) The fact that 
the JPACT-approved alignment did not reach into the western portion of the County- even 
though all Washington County business firms payed a payroll tax to Tri-Met - underlined 
what many in the west felt was yet another effort by downtown Portland to use transit to 
capture Washington County office workers and shoppers. 
Clackamas County officials stressed the complementary nature of their LRT 
proposal, arguing that the airport link would boost patronage on the eastside LRT line. 
However, they also pointed out that their LRT line would cost a great deal less than a 
westside line, since virtually all the necessary right of way was in governmental hands, and 
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that it could be constructed much more quickly than a westside counterpart. JPACT 
responded by authorizing a search for possible funding sources. 
Tri-Met commenced preliminary engineering on the westside in 1987. During the 
course of this work, Tri-Met was reluctantly forced to conclude that the 1983 JPACT-
approved alignment was no longer acceptable. During the intervening years parts of the 
approved route had been built over, and a great deal more employroent and residential 
development had taken place in the western portion of Washington County than had been 
anticipated. The new alignments to be considered would reach all the way to Hillsboro in 
the west, almost doubling the length of the line. What was most disturbing about the 
alignment discovery was the prospect of having the regime go through the regional 
consensus process once again to reach agreement on a new route. 
While westside LRT proponents contemplated major changes in their project, 
Clackamas County government and technical officials continued to press their north/south 
LRT line connecting the county seat with the Portland International Airport forward as a 
high-priority endeavor. These officials called for building both westside and I-205 LRT 
lines as part of a regional package, ushering in a new era of cooperation between 
Clackamas and Washington Counties, who historically had found themselves competitors 
for limited transportation funds. Clackamas County's assertiveness troubled Washington 
County officials, however, particularly when the former attempted to compare the I-205 
line with the westside line in a manner that reflected less favorably on the latter's priority 
project A Washington County Commissioner and JPACT member said she thought 
Clackamas County officials no longer supported westside LRT as the region's top priority 
project. She argued that adding more lines to the regional list would jeopardize finding for 
number one: "You can't do a little part of everything, or nothing gets done." (Green, 
1988) A Clackamas County Commissioner who was also a JP ACT member countered 
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that he was "shocked and appalled" by the accusation that his County was trying to disrupt 
the regional consensus (Kohler, 1988). Clackamas officials stressed their allegiance to the 
regime and to westside LRT, as they continued to argue that there wouldn't be any 
competition between the two projects since different funding sources would likely be 
involved. 
Extending westside LRT to downtown Hillsboro would permit that city to join an 
alliance with downtown Portland and downtown Beaverton. An appropriately chosen 
alignment would enable the three business centers to peacefully co-exist, each enjoying an 
enhanced capacity to reach potential workers and shoppers locating in the rapidly growing 
parts of Washington County. The Hillsboro city council strongly supported efforts to 
bring LRT to town, as did the city council of Forest Grove, a small city beyond Hillsboro 
that hoped to secure a place on the line for the future. 
However, two obstacles were present. The first was the concern that adopting a 
new alignment all the way to Hillsboro would necessitate a restudy of the entire project, 
delaying efforts for up to two years. The federal government had approved preliminary 
engineering funds solely for the 1983 alignment. In an effort to dispel any thoughts about 
foregoing the extension, a Washington County newspaper editorialized the crucial 
significance of the Hillsboro connection: "A project that ends [at the point designated by 
JPACT in 1983] will primarily serve commuters travelling between Beaverton and 
downtown Portland. A project that extends to Hillsboro will not only serve a greater 
number of commuters, but it will also provide a new route for intra-county 
travel.. .. Indeed, the support of many Washington County residents and officials is 
contingent upon seeing the line extended to Hillsboro. Proceeding with plans to build the 
line only to [the 1983 end point] could fracture consensus that is starting to grow for the 
light-rail project." 
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The other obstacle involved the politics of route selection, as an association 
representing land development and industrial finns in the corridor adjacent to the Sunset 
Highway argued for an alignment that would follow the Highway all the way from 
downtown Portland to Hillsboro, eliminating that portion of the LRT route in the central 
portion of the County between Hillsboro and Beaverton. Beaverton's planning director 
opposed this particular alignment, arguing that the Sunset Highway corridor route would 
not support the land use plans of many Washington County cities, including the plans of 
downtown Beaverton. 
While westside LRT work went forward, Clackamas County officials were 
increasingly concerned that their LRT project languished. The County's director of 
transportation planning, who was a TP AC member, thought that '"Portland and 
Washington County have formed a pretty fonnidable coalition. What they want, they get 
Unfortunately, they do not speak for Clackamas County."' (Gerdes, 1989) Earl 
Blumenauer bridled at the accusation that political power tactics were keeping LRT out of 
Clackamas County. He defended his cooperative efforts on behalf of County interests, and 
his support for bringing LRT to the County. 
This was clearly a critical period for the regime. Competition for LRT funds was 
intensifying. Bringing western Washington County into the LRT alliance was problematic. 
At the same time, the Westside Bypass project was under attack, and Clark County officials 
were concerned about the capacity of the regime to meet their needs. A leading member of 
the Oregon congressional delegation, whose district includes Washington County, 
announced that he intended to seek additional federal funds to study the Hillsboro westside 
LRT extension, and to permit this study to be done without having to restudy the entire 
route, thus saving two years. The significance of this is that the project would be eligible 
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for 75% federal funding, rather than the 50% contribution rate that the federal government 
intends to institute when the current formula expires in 1991. 
The Oregon delegation was successful. House and Senate transportation bills 
incorporated language directing the U.S. Urban Mass Transponation Administration to 
permit the Hillsboro extension to be conducted without delay, and providing funds for the 
work. Moreover, the Oregon delegation's efforts stimulated a similar effort by their 
Washington state counterparts, who lined up funding the LRT studies in a broad corridor 
including Clackamas County, Portland, and Clark County. Two possible Clackamas 
County-Clark County alignments, one via I-205 and another via downtown Portland, 
would be eligible for study within this broad corridor notion. Should these provisions 
survive a conference committee, and there is every indication they will, the LRT program 
for the entire region will be boosted greatly enhancing the stability of the regime. 
The nature of rail transit projects - the fact that they concentrate access advantages 
around a small number of station locations - greatly complicates the process of regional 
consensus building. The Portland transport regime dramatically illustrates one possible 
solution to the problem posed by the spatial concentration of benefits: a "coverage" 
strategy, including alliances between leading business centers based on transit network 
design. The success of the Congressional delegations, in tum based on the underlying 
stability of the regime, enabled the regime to pursue several rail transit possibilities 
simultaneously, thereby covering the region with potential rail transit benefits. The regime 
has also been sensitive to issues of alliance-sustaining network design. The coverage 
strategy requires large amounts of funding, however, to make it work. Finding the funds 
to construct an operate these projects is the remaining challenge to the regime that we 
discuss. 
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Case 4: Finding New Sources of Project Finance 
In early 1988 JPACT created the Public-Private Task Force on Transit Finance, 
consisting of several JP ACT members and representatives of leading metropolitan area 
business firms. Earl Blumenauer led the effon to form this task force, securing a grant 
from the Urban Mass Transportation Administration to finance its work. Blumenauer, who 
served as co-chair, set out what motivated him: "[I]t's clear that we can no longer be 
dependent on federal dollars to suppon large transit capital projects." The other Task Force 
co-chair, a member of the Tri-Met Board of Directors, said that one of the group's key 
objectives was to be "the catalyst for increased interest and investment by the business 
community in priority transit projects." (Federman, 1988) In addition to the JPACT-
appointed group, a number of top business executives, led by the president of the region's 
largest utility and reporting to the Portland Chamber of Commerce and the Oregon 
Business Council, pursued the objective of building a consensus among business owners 
throughout the area regarding which projects they might financially support. 
This was Blumenauer's second foray into the world of privatization. He had also 
spearheaded Project Breakeven, which involved the regional transit agency generating 
sufficient revenue to break even on its eastside LRT line by becoming a landowner. As 
originally proposed, the federal government would grant Tri-Met money to purchase land 
around two eastside LRT stations, one in central Gresham and the other near the site of a 
convention center that was under construction across the Willamette River from downtown 
Portland. Tri-Met would then lease the Gresham property to a shopping center developer, 
and the convention center site to a hotel developer. The agency would collect rental 
payments from the developers, as well as increased fare revenues from the passenger traffic 
generated by the two developments. Blurnenauer argued that the suburban project would 
not compete with downtown Portland, thereby provoking opposition from CBD business 
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groups. He justified his leadership on the land development initiative by pointing out that 
"We cannot afford to look at the regional rail system as pitting downtown Portland against 
Gresham. ... [E]ven though my responsibilities are in the city of Portland, I am convinced I 
am serving the citizens of Portland best if we have a regional transit system." (Church, 
1988) If the shopping center project materializes, Gresham will house the first suburban 
shopping center with an LRT station integrated by design. The U.S. Urban Mass 
Transportation Ad.ministration was reluctant to embrace Project Breakeven, because the 
agency does not see itself as being involved in land ownership and development, however, 
the agency was aware of congressional support for the project, led by the Oregon 
delegation. 
The Public-Private Task Force and the business group recommended a variety of 
funding strategies modeled on Blumenauer's Project Breakeven and other joint venture 
strategies. In addition, both groups recommended that JP ACT present a package of 
proposed legislation to the state legislature during the 1989 session to increase funding for 
the region's priority transportation projects. In early 1989 JPACT and Metro approved a 
set of freeway, transit, and road projects worth $1.5 billion, and a recommended funding 
plan. JPACT then constituted the Transportation 2000 Committee to carry the legislative 
program forward, composed of members of the two study groups. 
One aspect of the legislative package generated controversy within the regime: an 
extension of the Tri-Met payroll tax to local governments and non-profit organizations. 
These employers were currently exempt. School districts in the region generally opposed 
the payroll tax measure, which did not surprise the proponents, however, the Gresham 
City Council opposed it as well. The chair of the Senate Revenue, who was the Portland 
legislator centrally involved in the freeway relocation controversy, immediately charged that 
"Gresham had reneged on a deal made by counties and cities in the metropolitan area to 
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support an entire package of bills aimed at improving public transit and roads in the area. 
'I'm not willing to put up with this kind of nonsense with people from my region .... So just 
count me off (of supporting the package) until you people all get your act together. 11 The 
Gresham Council fell into line following this blast. 
JP ACT's legislative program was well-designed and strongly supported. An 
important source of imagery during the campaign was a Portland region free of the 
transportation and land use planning disasters that were devasting the western U.S. 
metropolitan areas with which Portland competed for invesnnent. A voiding gridlock 
would secure the region's economic future. Most of the legislative program survived 
intact, including proposals that the Oregon citizenry vote on a constitutional amendment that 
would permit local vehicle registration fees to be used for transit as well as road purposes, 
and a requirement that such local fees be approved by voters at the local level. 
The transportation regime was now positioned to reap the full rewards of its 
congressional and state legislative accomplishments. The Oregonian editorially exhorted 
the regime and the region: "The opportunity is two elections away and facing a deadline [to 
secure a local funding match for the westside LRT line]. Economic growth, a city 
transportation system that escapes gridlock, clean air and avoiding the endless expense of 
pouring highway funds into an insatiable urban freeway system depend on the voters. 11 
(The Oregonian, August 20, 1989) 
Lessons 
Shifrin(;! Transportation Decision Process 
There has been a significant change in the nature of the transportation decision 
making process as it is constituted in the Portland metropolitan region. Much of the early 
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process was ad hoc, exploratory or in response to a shifting federal environment. Much of 
that process has been institutionalized at the staff level of the TP AC process and through 
the policy discussions of the JPACT focused regime. Sources, people and procedures are 
established. A second significant aspect of this process is the role of JP ACT in the 
process. With the completion and development of several plans, there is an emphasis on 
implementation rather than planning. A final significant shift in JPACT has been in the 
changing leadership in the transportation planning processes in the metropolitan region. 
Because of the unconventional nature of the JPACT process, it's unique 
organizational structure, it's funding and it's relationship to METRO, it's existence is seen 
by some as precarious. It may be necessary to more formally recognize the existence of 
JP ACT in order to protect its present funding sources. The result of this could be to 
produce a perceived loss of functions to METRO. The loss would not be a real one 
because METRO does, in fact, participate in the development of JPACT decisions. The 
strong chamnan of JPACT and two other METRO counselors are on JPACT. They play a 
significant role in defining the JPACT agenda and influence the processes of the committee 
in tailoring decisions which are palatably endorsable by the general METRO council. To 
say that METRO merely defers to JP ACT on transportation decisions would be a naively 
simplistic caricature. To fail to follow JPACT decisions would undermine JPACT's 
authority and power and would destroy the working arrangements which exist in the 
transportation decision structure. Also at risk are the state and local aspects of JPACT's 
decisions, since only in the context of JP ACT are the entities outside of METRO's 
jurisdiction brought into the consensus process. To try to include those other entities in 
METRO's process would not be to include them on an equal footing. There are some 
dissatisfactions among some entities which are part of JPACT, but which are not 
represented on METRO. The continuing integrity of the regional consensus represented by 
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the regime has kept the players from radically altering the structure of JPACT or changing 
the overall structure of the regional transportation project list. 
There are also other threats to JPACT's existence. The original sources of funding 
are disappearing. There is increasingly greater local dominance in local transportation 
decision making. The federal role in transportation planning is fading and it is unlikely that 
the state will accept that financial role. As a result, JPACT, which is not a governmental 
entity, must rely-on Tri-Met or some other group to supply funding. To the extent that 
local funding may increase so may local control of the process. That will threaten the 
process since it is necessary to have all parties to the process committed to cooperation for 
the process to work. 
As we examine the lessons elicited from the cases presented above, it is clear that 
Portland's past success is the key to the transportation regime's hoped for future successes. 
Benefits won locally, statewide, and nationally by twisting the arms and picking the 
pockets of other politicians and governmental entities has bred a climate of working 
together to achieve even more and a fear of losing everything if the consensus is not 
maintained. Throughout the freeway relocation controversy JPACT members and other 
regime supporters, including the Oregon congressional delegation, clearly, self-
consciously, and consistently articulated the importance of maintaining the regional 
consensus. Challenges brought by activists operating outside the regional consensus were 
resisted by the regime. A measure of the strength of the regime was the fact that even 
relocation proponents spoke the language of consensus arguing that their advocacy need 
not constitute a threat. The question is: will the regime accommodate to plans, or will the 
logic of the project continue to drive the urban development process. 
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Similarly, the Portland transport regime dramatically illustrates one possible 
solution to the problem posed by the spatial concentration of benefits of LRT: a "coverage" 
strategy, including alliances between leading business centers based on transit network 
design. The success of the Congressional delegations, in turn based on the underlying 
stability of the regime, enabled the regime to pursue several rail transit possibilities 
simultaneously, thereby covering the region with potential rail transit benefits. Yet, at the 
same time, once funded the LRT lines will even further tie the regime's disparate spatial 
components together. Similarly, the effort represented by the public-private funding 
scheme to introduce new participants to the regime, also illustrates its adaptability. 
Confronted with resource scarcities that would threaten the ability of the regime to 
deliver on the promises it has made to cover the region with transit and highway systems, 
JPACT's members were willing to expand the participant list by including private sector 
representatives. The success of the Transportation 2000 coalition in wresting additional 
resources from the state to provide matching money has further reinforced the sentiments of 
hanging together to support the regional program. Their success hangs on voter 
authorization of constitutional amendments to operationalize the legislature's generosity. 
Additional JPACT issue prioritization and a~enda settin~ considerations 
Still with all these success, several issues remain problematic for the regional 
transportation planning processes and regime. Poor integration with Clark County has 
been a major problem for JP ACT. There has been no consensus on how to integrate the 
communities on either side of the Columbia River. There is little incentive for the Oregon 
JPACT delegates to support projects which primarily benefit Washington residents since 
the bulk of the population is south of the Columbia River. Federal funding programs 
driven by population based formulas automatically favor projects and programs south of 
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the River. Hence, the Washington delegation on JPACT has not been satisfied with the 
support for their projects. 
From the JP ACT point of view, Washington interests have been given the same 
consideration as each Oregon county and have a state representative on the committee as 
well. It is not, however the same as when CRAG was the MPO for the entire area. 
Vancouver has now developed its own MPO in the Intergovernmental Resource Center. Its 
activities are loosely tied to the Oregon transportation planning processes, however. 
This issue remains important in two principal ways. There is some sentiment that 
the Vancouver based C-TRAN bus system ought to be represented in regional 
transportation planning. There is further concern that the METRO plans for expanding 
light rail lines in several areas of the region have failed to recognize the possibility of inter-
ties with Washington in the setting of regional priorities for transportation planning. 
Another problem for JPACT is the under-representation of small cities. The 
JPACT structure allows one representative from each county for small cities, but individual 
cities are not always satisfied with that level of representation They often feel steam-rolled 
by the larger interests in the process. To some degree the small cities are involved in non-
regional transportation planning issues, thus outside of JP ACT's interest. However, in 
integrating the non-regional transportation and roadway issues, there appears to remain 
some room for improvement. 
While cities are indirectly represented on JPACT by the input which the county 
transportation planning organizations have on TPAC, there is a general reliance by the cities 
on the county transportation agencies to meet the needs of those cities. To a large measure 
this is appropriate due to the size and nature of the projects which cities have an interest in. 
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However, when the issues are larger, those of regional economic development and 
urbanization for example, there is a valid concern that the regional transportation planning 
organization should be adequately accessible to the cities. 
Why Does it Work in Portland? 
The curiosity represented by the Portland experience is in its success in building 
and maintaining a working regional decision system that has adapted and grown to meet 
new challenges beyond those originally confronting it. While JPACT's original success 
was fueled by external resources that could be distributed to ease the burden of 
cooperation, current issues do not offer the same kinds of solutions. Having already 
committed itself to the maintenance of transit and rail based transit as keys to the livability 
and future of the region, JP ACT must fight to find the resources necessary to fund this 
promised future. Its ability to transform itself both structurally and politically are a test of 
how well the concept of consensus and regional commitments has become institutionalized 
in the metropolitan area. 
The clear explanations for this success are not apparent. One element has been the 
traditional linkage between technicians and politicians to ensure the integrity of the 
decisions made and viability of the projects constructed. Another component has been the 
key leadership of select officials at critical points in time. Finally, the fortuitous utilization 
of senior politicians chairing key congressional committees has generated resources central 
to continued success. 
A great deal of luck has supported the efforts of the region's transportation regime. 
At the same time, the uncharacteristic commitment to utilize a collective consensualisrn to 
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seive regional needs appears to reflect an underlying political culture that has been 
supported by strong threads of continuity despite changes in key leaders over time. 
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